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ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES: ECONOMIC
AND ACTUARIAL EVIDENCE
By PHELIM P. BOYLE* and
JOHN D. MURRAY*"
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978 the Supreme Court of Canada attempted to provide definitive
guidance on the principles to be used in the assessment of damages in personal
injury1 and fatal accident cases. 2 A number of articles and commentaries
have discussed these principles and their implications.3 Since these decisions
were handed down, the lower courts have struggled to interpret in the con-
text of particular cases the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. These
developments have highlighted the importance of economic and actuarial
evidence in the estimation of pecuniary loss. The purpose of the present paper
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1 Andrews v. Grand and Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 83 D.L.R. 452, 3
C.C.L.T. 225; Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 609, 3 C.C.L.T.
272; Thornton v. Bd. of School Trustees, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 480,
3 C.C.L.T. 257.
2 Keizer v. Hanna, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 342, 82 D.L.R. (3d) 449, 3 C.C.L.T. 316.
3 See, e.g., Charles, A New Handbook on the Assessment of Damages in Personal
Injury Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada (1978), 3 C.C.L.T. 345; Bissett-Johnson,
Damages for Personal Injuries - Tize Supreme Court Speaks (1978), 24 McGill L.J. 316.
OSGOODE HALL
LAW JOURNAL
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
is to discuss the current situation from the perspective of an economist and
an actuary and provide a critical analysis of some of the issues involved.
The net discount rate used in the calculation of pecuniary loss critically
affects the size of the award. Part II of this paper presents an economic an-
alysis which should prove helpful in the selection of an appropriate net dis-
count rate. This approach involves an analysis of the relationships between
interest rates, inflation rates and earnings growth and has been accepted by
the trial courts in some recent cases.4 Part III discusses the problem of valuing
the housework performed by a spouse and presents several possible approaches.
Part IV is devoted to a discussion of the nature and impact of actuarial
assumptions and, in particular, the mortality assumptions. To illustrate the
impact of the underlying variables in the size of the award various tables have
been prepared.
Part V examines the treatment of the tax factor in the assessment of
pecuniary loss. It is suggested that some of the principles enunciated by the
Supreme Court in this connection are economically unsound and logically
inconsistent. Furthermore, it has been suggested that by ignoring the tax
factor in personal injury awards the plaintiff will be over-compensated. It is
argued that in many cases, particularly where longer time periods are in-
volved, the situation is the exact opposite. A more theoretically correct pro-
cedure that is designed to produce an after-tax income stream identical to
the after-tax income stream which has been lost is referred to in this part.
The last few sections of the paper discuss specific illustrations of the
application of economic and actuarial methods to the valuation of pecuniary
loss. A case study is presented to illustrate a number of the concepts discussed
earlier in the paper and to highlight certain practical points.
Some of the weaknesses of the lump sum award procedure for compen-
sating plaintiffs in personal injury and fatal accident cases can be overcome
by a system of periodic payments. The paper concludes with a very brief
discussion of structured settlements and highlights the importance of including
a suitable provision for inflation protection in these agreements.
II. ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
In order to calculate the sum of money necessary to compensate the
plaintiff for all pecuniary losses resulting from a serious accident or fatality
long range economic assumptions are required. This calculation typically in-
volves 1) forecasting a stream of foregone earnings and additional living
expenses, and 2) forecasting the rate of return the plaintiff can reasonably
expect to earn by investing the lump sum awarded by the court. The rate of
return on investment is used to discount the projected stream of lost income
and thereby obtain a present value (or lump sum) equivalent for these future
losses. The discounting procedure is necessary in order to avoid over-com-
pensating the plaintiff. Since any monies received today can be invested to
4 Lan v. Wu, [1979] 2 W.W.R. 122, [1979] 7 C.C.LT. 314 (B.C.S.C.), rev'd with
respect to quantum of damages, (1980), 21 B.C.L.R. 216 (B.C.C.A.).
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generate a stream of future income, the plaintiff is able to draw on both the
capital and the returns provided by the award so as to offset foregone earn-
ings and additional living expenses.
It is contended that many awards have been calculated at unreasonably
high discount rates.5 While estimates of the base period loss and the life of
the award are important ingredients in the lump sum calculation, the final
value is also very sensitive to changes in the discount rate. Due to their failure
to appreciate the significance of variations in the discount rate, the courts
have adopted, until recently, a rather off-handed approach to their deter-
minations.6 Direct economic evidence was seldom considered on this im-
portant issue. Instead, the courts relied on secondary sources and casual ob-
servation, generally misinterpreting any data and theories that were provided.?
The seven percent net discount rate applied in the four Supreme Court
decisions appears to be based on overly optimistic estimates of real invest-
ment returns and it made no allowance for growth in real earnings and pro-
ductivity adjustments. Allowance must also be made with regard to wages for
growth in foregone income, recognizing the impact on earnings of productivity
gains and career advancement. The net discount rate used to determine the
lump sum award should equal the forecast rate of return on investments less
the forecast growth in earnings.
Unfortunately, experience has shown that it is all but impossible to fore-
cast these income growth and investment return factors over an extended
period of time due to the great uncertainty surrounding future economic
events-most notably, inflation. Changes in the growth of earnings and the
rate of return on investments are largely dependent upon the rate of infla-
tion. [See Appendix I.] Wages and salaries typically rise by an amount suffi-
cient to compensate workers for general price increases plus an allowance for
increased productivity. Although changes in labour income usually follow
changes in inflation quite closely, income adjusts by more than the rate of
inflation, thereby providing a gradual improvement in the standard of living
enjoyed by the workers. This difference between the growth in "nominal"
income and the rate of inflation is often referred to as the growth in "real"
income. The size of the differential will vary from individual to individual
depending upon his age, job experience and advancement opportunities, given
the general state of the economy.
5 Supra notes 1 and 2.
6 For an additional analysis of the pitfalls see, e.g., Dexter, Murray, and Pollay,
inflation, Interest Rates and Indemnity: The Economic Realities of Compensation Awards
(1979), 13 U.B.C. L. Rev. 298.
7The famous "Deutsch forecast" was conveyed to the Supreme Court indirectly
through the testimony of a home economist (Doris Dadir). It is based on a preliminary
and dated analysis by the Economic Council of Canada and was quoted out of context.
Julian v. Northern and Central Gas Corp. (1978), 5 C.C.L.T. 148 at 159 per Southey J.
(H.C. Ont.) cites the source of this forecast as a report given by the ECC to the Minister
of Labour regarding inflation to be taken into account when management and unions of
the railway companies were negotiating pension benefits. This forecast was based, how-
ever, on data gathered over 1962 to 1972 and, as pointed out in the Julian case, thus did
not encompass the higher inflation rates since that time.
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Investment returns are also affected by inflation since the yield offered
on securities adjusts to reflect investors' expectations about inflation over the
life of the asset. Investors expect their investment returns to compensate them
for inflation and to provide for some growth in purchasing power. The dif-
ference between the "nominal" rate of return realized on any security and
the rate of inflation is called the "real" rate of return. The size of this dif-
ferential will vary according to the securities held by the investor and will
reflect the overall risk of his investment portfolio.
A. Inflation
Given the major role inflation plays in the income and investment return
components of lump sum calculations, a reliable forecast of future price move-
ments would seem to be essential if one is to arrive at a fair settlement. Appen-
dices II and III provide some information on past price trends and forecasts of
future inflation. Although inflation has averaged two to three percent annually
over the past fifty years, most researchers are now projecting higher inflation
rates of seven to eleven percent over the immediate to medium-term. Beyond
the mid 1980's there is no consensus as few economists are willing to risk an
estimate for the long-term. Inflation is affected by a number of variables which
cannot be accurately predicted. These variables include: future monetary pol-
icy, government deficits, exchange rate movements, and supply-side shocks
(e.g., oil price increases). Indeed, unforeseen changes in the above variables
have played havoc with the forecasts made for the 1970 to 1980 period. [See
Appendix IV.] It seems that even medium-term projections have very limited
usefulness.
To the extent that both components of the discount rate respond to
changes in the inflation rate the inability to accurately forecast inflation would
seem to present a serious obstacle to the lump sum calculation. Fortunately
this is not the case. The dependence shared by income growth and investment
return on inflation actually makes the task much easier. One need not fore-
cast inflation if it affects both streams symmetrically. The discount rate is
determined solely by the difference between the growth rate used to augment
earnings over time and the rate of return expected on invested capital. This
difference merely reflects differences in their respective real rates if they
adjust to inflation by equivalent amounts.8 Therefore, the appropriate discount
rate can be estimated by obtaining forecasts of the productivity gains in wages
and real returns on investments. This approach produces more reliable esti-
mates than the alternative nominal approach since productivity gains and real
investment on diversified portfolios are relatively stable over time.
8 For example, assume wages grow at 3 percent and investments yield 4 percent in
an economy with no inflation. Our discount rate would then be 1 percent (4% return
on investment less a 3% growth in wages). If inflation was forecast to grow at 10 per-
cent the following year, one would expect workers to demand a wage increase of 13
percent (or a real growth in income of 3 percent after adjustment for inflation). Simi-
larly, investors would demand a 14 percent yield on securities in order to realize the
same "real" return of 4 percent. The discount rate appropriate in this inflationary econ-
omy is still 1 percent, but can now be obtained one of two ways: 1) deducting the growth
in nominal wages from the nominal rate of return on investment, or 2) deducting the
growth in real wages from the real rate of return.
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In summary, it is unnecessary to forecast inflation in order to arrive at
an equitable lump sum settlement. The discount rate required for these cal-
culations can be reasonably approximated by observing the past behaviour of
labour income and investment returns, where both have been adjusted for
inflation.
B. Earnings Performance
Evidence is presented in this section which suggests that the past rate of
growth in earnings has equalled (and at times exceeded) the rate of return that
investors have realized on relatively riskless investment portfolios. Therefore,
a relatively low net discount rate is recommended in cases involving lost
earnings. In other cases where only extra living costs are at issue the appro-
priate rate may reflect only real investment returns as no offset is required
for real earnings growth.
While it is difficult to forecast the rate of growth applicable to the fore-
gone earnings stream of a specific individual, data on past wage growth for
a number of industrial sectors and the individual's own salary history should
provide some guidance. National averages for the construction, manufactur-
ing, and service sectors are shown in Appendix V. Wage growth in these
sectors has moved within a fairly narrow range of two to five percent since
1920. Earnings performance in the professions has been very similar [See
Appendix VI.] Resource constraints and other disruptive structural changes
make smaller productivity gains probable over the immediate to medium-
term; however, a conservative range of one or two percent for real wage
growth, especially over the long-term, is not unrealistic.9
Three significant factors which usually favour even higher growth rates
should be noted. First, there is reason to believe that many workers experi-
ence higher rates of growth in their earnings than the data above would
suggest, since earnings improvement via promotion and other forms of career
advancement is ignored.' 0 Age-earnings profiles indicate that experience and
promotion increments accelerate earnings growth by an extra two or three
percent in the first few years of work and then gradually diminish."
The second factor is related to pensions and fringe benefits. The data
also excludes those items which are an increasingly important component of
most workers' total compensation package. Fringe benefits have grown more
rapidly than the wage portion of earnings.
Finally, the relevant growth rate for our calculations is the rate at which
9 See Institute for Policy Analysis and Data Resources of Canada, 4 Canada Review,
No. 2, (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1976). Informetrica Ltd., The Canadian Econ-
omy of 1986, Post-Workshop 11, 1976. (Ottawa, Informetrica, 1976). Eyford and Cain,
Simulation with CANDIDE to the Year 2000 Discussion Paper No. 89, (Ottawa: Eco-
nomic Council of Canada, 1977).
10 Dick, Determining the Present Value of Future Income: Selecting Income Growth
Rates (1974), 41 J. Risk and Ins. 729. Harris, Selecting Income Growth and Discount
Rates in Wrongful Death and Injury Cases: Comment (1977), 44 J. Risk and Ins. 117.
11 Millar and Hornseth, Present Value Estimated Lifetime Earnings, Technical Paper
16 (Washington: Bureau of Census, Dept. Commerce, 1967).
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the lost earnings increase. This is not necessarily consistent with the growth
rate observed in the plaintiff's pre-accident occupation. If the victim is able
to continue working in some alternative employment, one must focus on the
difference between his pre- and post-accident earnings streams. An example
will clarify this final point.
Let the plaintiff's pre-accident earnings be $10,000 initially and further
assume that these earnings would have grown at four percent a year. If his
earnings in an alternative job begin at $5,000 and grow at two percent a year,
then the appropriate earnings adjustment factor is a variable rate and is not
the four percent associated with his previous job or the two percent associated
with his present job. In the first year the loss will grow by a rate of six per-
cent, but it will grow at a declining rate in future years.
C. Investment Performance
The real rates of return needed to discount the growth adjusted income
stream can be obtained in one of two ways. The "historical approach" fo-
cuses on the averages of past real rates of return and modifies these figures,
where required, to accommodate any peculiarities which the forecaster be-
lieves will distinguish the future period from earlier years. The "inflation
forecast approach" uses the nominal yields currently observed on long-run
bonds and then adjusts these returns by the forecast rate of inflation. Both
methods will produce the same rates if consistent assumptions are made con-
cerning inflation.
Despite this apparent equivalence, we believe that the "historical ap-
proach" produces much more reliable projections. The "inflation approach"
is more susceptible to serious forecasting errors because of its reliance on an
accurate forecast of inflation to obtain the required real rates.12 It is interest-
ing to note, nevertheless, that even this approach yields real rates of only
4.0 to 4.5 percent for the forty year investment horizon under consideration
here, when the "optimistic" inflation forecasts contained in Appendix IV are
applied to the high nominal yields now offered on long-term government
bonds.' 3 While these figures are much too high for fixed income returns they
provide a benchmark for comparisons with the "historical" results described
below.
Researchers have recently completed a comprehensive investigation of
the investment returns realized on several alternative investments in the
United States.14 Total returns on common stocks, corporate bonds, long-term
government bonds, and Federal Treasury bills were analyzed over the period
1926 to 1976 and all possible sub-periods. The results showed that returns
were sensitive to the riskiness of the particular investment.' 5 [See Appendix
12 See Section A, supra.
13 These figures assume that inflation will average a conservative 4 percent in the
thirteen years following 1985, and that bond yields over the remaining twenty or twenty-
five years average a generous 2 percent, net of inflation.
14 Ibbotson and Sinquefield, Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation: The Past (1926-1976)
and the Future (1977-2000) (Chicago: Financial Analysts Research Foundation, 1976).
15 Supra note 14.
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VII.] Treasury bills, which have a fixed interest return, a short maturity and
no default risk had a 2.4 percent average nominal return. Since average in-
flation was 2.3 percent per annum from 1926 to 1976, the real return from
holding this security was approximately zero. Long-term government bonds,
which subject the investor to more risk,"; had a very small positive real yield
while long-term corporate bonds which are more likely to default carried a
slightly larger return. Only when most of the investor's portfolio was com-
posed of common stock did returns become significantly positive in real terms.
When the analysis was replicated with Canadian data, the results were
almost identical.17 [See Appendix VIII.] Returns adjusted for inflation were
all negative for Treasury bills, government bonds, and corporate bonds over
the 1937-1976 period.' 8 Moreover, these results are not particularly sensi-
tive to the investment period over which they are calculated. When the same
calculations are made for the buoyant post-war period, real returns on com-
mon stocks are marginally higher, but real returns on the other fixed income
securities are virtually unchanged.' 9 [See Appendices IX and X.]
Since a portfolio composed entirely of common stocks subjects the in-
vestor to tremendous risk, it is an inappropriate substitute for a secure in-
come stream. A balanced portfolio composed of bonds and stocks, displaying
a modest level of risk, cannot be expected to earn more than a three to four
percent real return. If the portfolio is dominated by fixed income securities
such as bonds, the rates should be slightly lower. Transaction costs and man-
agement fees involved in investing funds will also reduce the rates.
III. ESTIMATION OF VALUE OF UNPAID EMPLOYMENT
Many of the products and services produced in our economy originate
from non-market activities through "unpaid" employment. Examples of this
are the housework performed by a spouse and the supervision of children by
a parent. The economic losses sustained by victims of disabling accidents and
their dependents often include lost domestic services and the foregone bene-
fits of other non-market work. These losses should be incorporated in the
award.
Three methodologies are commonly used to measure the value of unpaid
employment: the "opportunity cost" approach, the "individual-function-cost"
approach and the "third-party substitute" approach.2° Functions are catego-
rized and average times are assigned to each according to the socio-economic
characteristics of the household. The methodologies differ with respect to
the wages which are used to convert the hours worked into annual dollar
equivalents.
16 Id.
17 Williamson, Rates of Return on Stocks and Bonds: Historical Comparisons (un-
published manuscript, U.B.C. Fac. of Comm. & Bus. Admin., 1977).
18 Supra notes 14 and 17.
19 Id.
2 0 Adler and Hawrylyshyn, Estimates of the Value of Household Work Canada,
1961 and 1971 (1978), 24 Rev,. of Income and Wealth 333.
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The first approach assumes that a utility maximizing individual adjusts
his or her allocation of time so as to equalize the "return" to time invested
at the margin in each activity.21 This process implies that "unpaid" work in
the home should be valued at the same wage rate the individual receives, or
would receive, for a marginal hour of paid work outside the home. Obviously
there are certain theoretical and practical problems associated with this pro-
cedure. Individuals probably do not place equal subjective values on all their
activities. Furthermore, few people are able to freely adjust their hours of
work and the hours devoted to certain other activities. Institutional constraints
and other forms of "fixedness" make it difficult to trade-off paid and unpaid
employment.
The second approach multiplies the hours of unpaid work of the indivi-
dual by the average wage paid to persons outside the home who perform
similar functions. For example, the time estimated for house cleaning is mul-
tiplied by the hourly wage received by professional cleaners and the time
estimated for dishwashing is multiplied by the hourly wage received by dish-
washers at a restaurant. In this way each function has a unique wage assigned
to it, and total value becomes a weighted average of the components. 22
The third approach is somewhat simpler. It merely asks what one would
have to pay a housekeeper or repairman to perform all the services previously
provided by the injured party or the deceased.23 The value generated with
this last approach is usually more conservative than others.
Whichever measure is selected, it is important to remember that all the
services provided by the unpaid employment were essentially tax-free before
the accident. After the accident they must be paid out of investment returns
which are taxable.
IV. ACTUARIAL EVIDENCE: THE MORTALITY ASSUMPTION
In the Andrews case Dickson J. conceded that "[s]o long as we are tied
to lump-sum awards, however, we are tied also to actuarial calculations as
the best available means of determining amount. ' 24 Although there are a
number of articles which describe the basis of actuarial calculations, 25 it is
clear that the courts often have serious problems in accepting and under-
standing this type of evidence. Sometimes there is reluctance in accepting
actuarial evidence with regard to the survival prospects of the plaintiff on
21 Hawrylyshyn, Estimating the Value of Household Work in Canada, 1971 (Ot-
tawa: Stats. Can., 1978).
212 Hunt and Kiker, Valuation of Household Services: Methodology and Estimation
(1979), 46 J. Risk and Ins. 697.
23 The courts seem to be using this latter approach, see e.g., Franco v. Woolfe
(1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 549 at 552, 69 D.L.R. (3d) 501 at 504 (C.A.).
24 Supra note 1, at 236-37 (S.C.R.), 458 (D.L.R.), 230 (C.C.L.T.).
25 See, e.g., Prevett, Actuarial Assessment of Damages (1968), 94 J. of Inst. of
Actuaries 293; Howroyd and Howroyd, The Assessment of Compensation for Loss of
Support (1958), 75 South African L.J. 65; Callisbird, Damages in Personal Injuries
Cases, Woodsworth ed., (Vancouver: UBC Centre for Continuing Education, 1978);
Traversi, Actuaries and the Courts (1956), 29 Aust. L.J. 557.
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the grounds that the actuary uses statistics and averages developed on the
basis of a large population. That is, the plaintiff is a particular individual and
there is often a desire to have the projections based or related to his particular
characteristics. During the discussion of Mr. Prevett's paper to the Institute
of Actuaries this point was clearly expressed by Mr. Gilley, a consulting
actuary.
It was at this point, he suspected, that some judges said,
"Ah, but we are not dealing with the average man, we are dealing with the plaintiff,
and there is in consequence, no way in which an actuary can help us."... If the
actuarial calculation were rejected it would only be rejected on the grounds that
the plaintiff did not have the same characteristics as the group of individuals whose
experience in relationship to the relevant contingencies was the foundation for the
assumptions on which the calculation was made. If, however, the relevant points
of difference between the characteristics of the plaintiff and those of the group
could be identified, it should be possible to modify the experience of the group in
such a way as to make the actuarial calculation appropriate once more. That was
a process familiar to every underwriter.26
At this stage it may be useful to analyse the impact of the mortality
factor using a set of illustrative calculations. Table 1 contains figures for the
lump sum equivalent of an amount of $1,000 per annum payable in the case
of a male life starting at different ages and using various interest rates. It is
assumed for convenience that the $1,000 is payable at the end of each year
if the life is alive and that consequently the payments are made for life. The
interest rates used correspond to the net discount rates which were analysed
in Part II.
Table I Present Value of $1000 per annum at
different interest rates assuming
1975-77 Canadian Life Table (Males)
mortality and payments made for life.
Interest rate percentage per annum
Age 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20 $51593 $39503 $31177 $25282 $20996 $17800 $15361 $13458
30 42396 33837 27617 23002 19507 16810 14690 12995
40 33093 27512 23238 19913 17289 15187 13482 12081
50 24358 21055 18393 16226 14442 12960 11715 10661
60 16735 14995 13526 12275 11202 10278 9474 8773
70 10549 9758 9060 8441 7890 7398 6956 6558
80 5942 5644 5370 5118 4887 4673 4476 4292
Table 1 indicates that for a given interest rate assumption the present
value of the stream of future payments decreases with age. The older a
person is, the shorter the expected period during which the payments will
be made. This Table also illustrates, however, the dramatic impact of chang-
ing the interest rate assumption from the figure of two percent, which is in
line with the economic analysis in this paper, to the seven percent per annum
employed in the four landmark Supreme Court decisions. For example, in the
case of a male aged twenty, assuming an initial payment of $20,000 per
26 Prevett, id. at 325-26.
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annum; the present value of such a lifetime payment stream at a two percent
discount rate is
20 X 31177 = $623,540.
If, however, the interest rate is raised to seven percent per annum, then the
revised value of this payment stream becomes
20 X 13458 = $269,160.
This represents a reduction of fifty-seven percent and highlights the critical
role played by the economic assumptions employed in the valuation pro-
cedure. By the same token it confirms the importance of economic evidence
in cases involving the assessment of damages.
In order to give a compact representation of the mortality experience
reflected in a particular life table, the concept of "the expectation of life" is
used. This is a very useful concept and it is extremely helpful to the courts.
It is, however, a summary statistic and does not embody all the characteristics
and features of a given mortality table. Put another way, the expectation of
life for a male aged twenty could be the same under two different mortality
tables. The fact that the "expectation of life" for a male aged twenty under
the 1975-77 Canadian Life Table is 51.593 can be visualized as follows. 27
Imagine a large group of males all aged twenty. For each life the addi-
tional years of life are counted. The average of this series is the expectation
of life: 51.593. If half of the large group of twenty year old lives died at age
fifty while the other half died at age ninety the expectation of life would be
the average of thirty and seventy, i.e., fifty. In practice of course there is a
probability of death at each age. Using the same mortality assumptions and
ages as Table 1 the expectations of life are given in Table 2.
Table 2 Expectation of life on the basis of
1975-77 Canadian Life Table (Males)








Sometimes the Courts value an income stream by taking first the life
expectancy in question and then computing an "annuity certain" 28 for a
period equal to the life expectancy in question. This procedure is not strictly
accurate from a purely theoretical point of view. This is because the life
expectancy, being an average figure, does not uniquely capture the year by
27 This is the "curtate" expectation of life and is 6 months below the actual expecta-
tion of life normally used.
28 "Annuity certain." This is a well-defined actuarial concept referring to a stream
of periodic payments that are payable for a fixed period. Unlike a life annuity these
payments are not contingent upon the survival of a given individual. Hence, it can be
valued using just pure compound interest functions.
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year variations in the survival probabilities. If this approach is used the
resulting figures will be higher than the correct ones, except in the case of a
zero discount rate where they coincide. Table 3 gives the valuation factors
or multipliers when this approach is employed. If one compares Table 3 with
Table 1 it will be noted that the differences between corresponding entries are
not too large. The average error in using the life expectancy approach (Table
3) results in an overstatement of the true value by about forty-six percent.
If the payment streams had ceased at age sixty-five instead of continuing
for life, the difference between these two approaches becomes even less. The
courts sometimes include a specific deduction to allow for the plaintiff's early
death. If the valuation procedure has been properly carried out as in Table 1
it would appear that this is completely incorrect. The survival probabilities
embodied in the calculation already include a specific allowance to cover the
possibility of early death; thus, this procedure involves double counting.
Table 3 Value of $1000 per annum when an
annuity certain corresponding to the
plaintiffs life expectancy is used.
(Same parameter values as Table 2)
Interest rate percentage per annum
Age 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20 $51593 $40152 $32000 $26080 $21695 $18386 $15842 $13850
30 42396 34417 28405 23813 20260 17473 15257 13475
40 33093 28057 24037 20800 18173 16021 14243 12763
50 24358 21523 19133 17108 15383 13906 12635 11537
60 16735 15339 14104 13007 12031 11160 10381 9681
70 10549 9965 9426 8929 8471 8046 7653 7288
80 5942 5741 5551 5369 5197 5034 4878 4729
Sometimes additional medical evidence indicates that the plaintiff's life
expectancy has been reduced and the court attempts to obtain the value of an
award by adjusting figures already calculated on the basis of normal mortal-
ity. Care is needed here because the "obvious" approach is not always
correct. Suppose that the life expectancy has been reduced from thirty years
to twenty years. It would be natural to assume that the revised award would
be two thirds of the original award. This is only the case if a zero net dis-
count rate has been used. The life expectancy of a male aged thirty from
Table 2 is 42.396 years whereas the corresponding figure for a male aged
forty is 33.093. Thus, there is a reduction in life expectancy of 9.303 years
if, as a result of an accident, a thirty year old male can be expected to have
the mortality experience corresponding to a forty year old male. Since the
ratio of 9.303 to 42.396 is .2194 there has been a 21.94 percent reduction in
the plaintiff's life expectancy. Using the figures in Table 1 one can compute
the revised values of the lump sum equivalents of $1000 per annum under
both sets of mortality assumptions.
Table 4 shows the value of $1,000 per annum under both sets of mor-
tality assumptions and various net discount rates: the percentage reduction
in the award by using the heavier (older) mortality assumption is given in
the final column. Note that as the net discount rate used increases the amount
of this percentage reduction decreases. Thus, if a three percent discount rate
is used the actual reduction is 13.4 percent and it would be incorrect to use a
1978]
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21.9 percent reduction. The rationale for this difference lies in the fact that
under the operation of compound interest payments made at points in the
distant future count for less than payments made in the near future (as long
as a positive net discount rate is used).
Table 4 Changes in lump sum awards
corresponding to lifetime payments
of $1000 per annum resulting from increased
mortality in the case of a male aged 30
(Values from Table 2)
Interest Rate Value of $1000 per annum
Old Basis New Basis Correct
(Normal mortality) (Increased mortality) Percentage
% p.a. (age 30) (age 40) Reduction
0 $42396 $33093 21.9
1 33837 27512 18.7
2 27617 23238 15.9
3 23002 19913 13.4
4 19507 17289 11.4
5 16810 15187 9.7
6 14690 13482 8.2
7 12995 12081 7.0
It is worth pointing out that the relative error involved in reducing the
lump sum value calculated on the basis of the normal mortality assumption
by a factor corresponding to the reduction in life expectancy increases with
the interest rate used. If a seven percent interest rate assumption is employed
and the "correct" assumption is two percent then this approach aggravates
the error already present.
A similar type of error can result when attempting to modify an award
for loss of prospective earnings by amending a figure which is based on one
assumed retirement age to adjust for a lower retirement age. Figures may
be available on the basis of retirement at age sixty-five when figures based
on age sixty are required. [See Tables 5 and 6.] The entries on Table 6 are
smaller reflecting the shorter time period until retirement.
Table 5 Lump sum equivalent of $1000 per annum payable
until age 65 or earlier death based on
Canadian Life Table Mortality 1975-77 (Males)
Male Interest Rate percentage per annum
Age 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20 $41703 $33745 $27793 $23275 $19796 $17077 $14921 $13189
25 37069 30673 25745 21902 18869 16448 14493 12896
30 32338 27369 23423 20260 17701 15611 13889 12457
35 27576 23873 20842 18344 16270 14536 13075 11837
40 22848 20235 18030 16159 14565 13198 12021 11001
45 18196 16486 14998 13699 12561 11560 10676 9894
50 13647 12650 11756 10952 10227 9572 8979 8441
55 9195 8703 8266 7862 7486 7138 6813 6511
60 4697 4562 4432 4308 4190 4077 3968 3864
65 - - - - - - - -
[VOL. 19, NO. 1
Actuarial Damages
Table 6 Lump sum equivalent of $1000 per annum
payable until age 60 or earlier death
based on Canadian Life Table Mortality
(1975-77 Males)
Male Interest Rate percentage per annum
Age 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20 $37844 $31228 $26144 $22190 $19079 $16601 $14604 $12977
25 33174 28003 23907 20632 17989 15836 14065 12596
30 28414 24541 21378 18777 16622 14823 13311 12032
35 23620 20877 18567 16611 14946 13522 12297 11238
40 18850 17053 15491 14129 12937 11891 10968 10151
45 14131 13085 12148 11306 10547 9863 9243 8682
50 9467 8975 8521 8099 7708 7345 7008 6693
55 4803 4663 4530 4403 4281 4165 4053 3946
60 - - - - - - - -
Consider a male aged forty with an expected retirement age of sixty-five.
On the basis of Table 5 the lump sum equivalent or present value of a $1,000
per annum income stream, assuming a two percent per annum net discount
rate, is $18,030. If there is additional evidence that suggests that sixty is the
appropriate retirement age, then it might be tempting to reason as follows;
with a retirement age of sixty-five there were twenty-five years left and with
a retirement age of sixty there are only twenty years remaining. By taking
20/25 or eighty percent of the amount of $18,030 one obtains the revised fig-
ure of $14,424, whereas the accurate figure from Table 6 is $15,491. This dis-
crepancy arises because the short cut approach takes into account neither
mortality nor compound interest. It can be contended that the short cut
approach gives an answer that is approximately correct and since there are
many imponderables strict precision is not required.
There seems to be strong grounds, however, for performing accurately
those calculations which can be carried out exactly even though there may
be considerable uncertainty regarding some of the underlying assumptions.
More importantly, several of the short cut approaches involve a bias and
their cumulative impact can be substantial.
Both Tables 5 and 6 serve to reinforce the point made earlier concern-
ing the impact of the net discount rate assumption on the value of the future
earnings stream. In the case of a male aged twenty, with an initial wage level
of $20,000 the present value of the future earnings stream, assuming a two
percent per annum net discount rate and retirement at age sixty-five, is
20 X 27793 = $555,860.
If, instead, the retirement age is assumed to be sixty, then the revised amount is
20 X 26114 = $522,280.
If, however, the net discount rate employed is changed from two percent per
annum to seven percent while retaining the retirement age of sixty-five, then
the consequences are much more dramatic. With the seven percent per annum
assumption the present value is
20 X 13189 = $263,780.
For an older life the changing of the retirement age assumption becomes
more significant. For example, for a male aged fifty-five earning $45,000 per
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annum the present value of future earnings on the basis of a retirement age
of sixty-five and a net discount rate of two percent per annum is
45 X 8266 = $371,970.
If, instead, a retirement age of sixty is assumed, the revised figure is
45 X 4530 = $203,850.
Notice that in this case raising the net discount rate has a smaller but still
substantial impact. If the net discount rate is seven percent per annum instead
of two percent per annum and the same retirement age of sixty-five is used
for both calculations, the amount of the award declines from $371,970 to
$292,995.
V. TAX COMPLICATIONS
It seems as if many plaintiffs have been undercompensated because the-
courts have either failed to adjust their awards for tax considerations or have
done so in a "lopsided" inequitable fashion. Victims in personal injury cases
typically have their awards based on gross of tax pecuniary damages, while
awards in fatal accident situations are based on after-tax losses.29 In the
former, the courts have justified the "gross approach" with two seemingly
reasonable but quite spurious arguments. The net impact of taxes is probably
minimal, they suggest, as both the lost earnings and compensating investment
income streams are taxable. Also, future tax legislation is an uncertain thing
-- difficult, if not impossible, to forecast.
This attitude is at variance with the facts and inconsistent with the
stance adopted by the courts in other even more speculative matters. Major
tax revisions are legislated very occasionally, so the present tax provisions
would seem to offer a reasonably accurate (though perhaps conservative)
guide to future tax obligations. The courts are willing to entertain and act
upon highly speculative admissions regarding inflation and other uncertain
economic conditions yet they dismiss tax projections as extremely unreliable.
The impact of taxation on the net economic benefits realized by the plaintiff
in personal injury cases has been ignored in the past. If our objective is to
fairly compensate the victims of serious accidents and fatalities it befits us
to take a less cavalier and defeatist attitude towards the necessary tax
adjustments.
29 This is the approach suggested by Dickson J. in Andrews, supra note 1, at 259-60
(S.C.R.), 475 (D.L.R.), 250-51 (C.C.LT.). The Supreme Court followed the decision
in R. v. Jennings, [1966] S.C.R. 532, 57 D.L.R. (2d) 644, in that no deduction was to
be made for taxes which would have been paid from the income. They, however, did not
allow any sum for future taxes on the capital sum. This was based on the argument that
the court in a personal injury case is compensating the plaintiff for a loss or diminution
of earning capacity, not for loss of earnings. On the other hand, the court held that tax
would be taken into consideration in fatal injury cases because, in that circumstance,
the court is compensating the plaintiff for loss of support payments; these support pay-
ments come from the deceased's earnings but only after tax and the deceased's personal
expenditure were deducted. Secondary reasons for this method lay in the problem with
determining the tax burden because "rate and coverage of taxes swing with the political
winds." (Andrews, op. cit., at 260 (S.C.R.), 475 (D.L.R.), 251 (C.C.LT.) per Dickson J.)
This approach was also followed in the two personal injury cases: Arnold, supra
note 1; Thornton, supra note 1; and the fatal injury case Keiser, supra note 2.
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Only coincidentally will the tax effects impinging on the foregone earn-
ings stream and the substitute investment income stream cancel one another.
The plaintiff may actually be over-compensated by the gross approach when
the award spans a very short time period.30 In this case most of the com-
pensation is received as tax free capital from the award rather than as tax-
able investment income. Such occurrences, however, are the exception and
not the rule. Most awards involving significant sums of money span a longer
period of time in which the plaintiff faces onerous tax liabilities on the in-
vestment income forming the bulk of his or her compensation.
The lump sum settlement is made according to an exhausting fund
principle. Much of the interest earned in the early years must be reinvested
in order to accumulate enough capital to provide for income in later years.
The progressive nature of our tax system means, however, that a significant
portion of these large initial returns will be lost to taxes. The interest subse-
quently earned on the reinvested income will also be subject to tax. In short,
the plaintiff loses a considerable part of the settlement due to the effects of
a progressive tax system and the double taxation of his investment income.
This inequity is further aggravated because the tax system fails to dis-
tinguish between real and nominal interest rates. Although the present tax
system gives favourable treatment to realized capital gains and dividends
received from Canadian corporations, these advantages can be offset by the
discriminatory treatment accorded to interest income. By taxing nominal in-
terest rather than real interest, the system is actually taxing both the income
and the capital of the investor. Part of the nominal interest rate is an adjust-
ment for inflation, compensating the lender for the eroded purchasing power
of the dollars used to repay his principal. In order to receive the same after-
tax income in an inflationary economy as one could in an economy with
complete price stability, the investor must demand a nominal interest rate
that is increased by -I percent for every one percent in inflation (where
t is the investor's marginal tax rate). Evidence to date indicates that such
an adjustment is seldom observed in the market, thus implying a lower net
of tax real income for holders of debt in inflationary periods.3 '
The award must be adjusted to reflect these important tax considera-
tions. Net of tax losses should be equated with net of tax compensation.
The experience in past cases suggests that the adjustment can often be
substantial. The adjustment depends on the "life" of the award, the net
discount rate selected, and the base period loss.32 When a portion of the
pecuniary loss is explicitly or effectively after-tax in nature, the required
3 0 Krishna, Tax Factors in Personal Injury and Fatal Accident Cases: A Plea for
Reform (1978), 16 Osgoode Hall LJ. 723 at 727.
3 1 Pesando, The Impact of Inflation on Financial Markets in Canada (Montreal:
C. D. Howe Research Inst., 1976) at 31.
32 Patterson, Effective Presentation of Actuarial Evidence in Permanent Disability
Cases (1979), 37 Advocate 13 at 21-35 provides a detailed discussion of the procedures
needed to obtain "tax adjusted" awards. Rea, Inflation, Taxation and Damage Assessment
(1980), 58 Can. B. Rev. 280 at 286-97 provides an analysis of the impact of taxation on
damage awards.
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adjustment is even higher. For example, individuals receiving compensation
for the costs of future care and additional living expenses are now paying
for services which were essentially tax free before their accidents as they
were "self-produced." While most medical bills are tax deductible, some part
of the expenses related to future care and additional living expenses are not
(e.g., extra costs related to recreation and travel). The tax penalty is even
more severe in the case of fatalities. All cases are calculated on an after-tax
basis, but they are matched with a gross of tax present value sum. Inadequate
recognition is given to the taxes payable on the investment income generated
by the award. 33a It is surprising that this glaring asymmetry has not received
more attention.
VI. CASE STUDY
In this Part an illustrative case is presented and discussed. This exercise
serves to highlight many of the points made earlier and also helps to illustrate
some additional practical points.
A. Background
Pierre, a twenty year old male, was injured in an automobile accident
and sustained spinal cord injuries which rendered him a paraplegic. Prior to
the accident he was employed full-time as an electrician earning $30,000 per
annum. It is estimated that Pierre may be able to carry on some form of
"bench-work" (for example, television repairs) for which the current wages
are approximately $10,000 per annum. The assessment of pecuniary loss
involves estimating his lost earnings and additional living expenses.
For convenience, there is discussion of the various elements that enter
into the computation of pecuniary loss under different subheadings.
B. Earnings Performance
Pierre's earnings performance over the period comprising his expected
work life would have been influenced by his past experience, his occupation,
his chances for promotion, and general economic conditions.
As was mentioned above, Pierre was a fully apprenticed electrician at the
time of the accident. His gross wage rate was $12.30 per hour exclusive of
benefits and overtime. After the addition of fringe benefits his wage was
$15.38 per hour (roughly twenty-five percent higher). On an annual basis
this works out to approximately $30,000. His best alternative job following
the accident is a salaried position repairing televisions at $10,000 per year
(inclusive of benefits). Pierre's base period loss is therefore $20,000.
The annual rate of growth in the real wages of electricians was 2.5
percent from 1963-79. Adverse medium-term trends '34 recommend scaling
this figure, but one must also allow for the additional wage growth common-
M Julian, supra note 7. In this case, the plaintiff was awarded an increase of 25%
of the award to offset the amount of tax due on the amount of income earned from the
award.
34 See Part I1 B, supra.
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ly observed among younger workers. A real adjustment factor of two per-
cent seems reasonable, if not a bit conservative. Since there is no clear
indication as to the earnings growth Pierre could expect in his alternative job
a similar value was assumed. The implied growth rate for lost real wages
is therefore two percent.
C. Investment Returns
A portfolio diversified to include fixed income securities and common
stock is recommended in order to provide a secure investment income stream
and to act as a buffer against unanticipated inflation. 35 Based on the historical
data, a three percent real rate of return on investment seems appropriate. The
transactions costs related to brokerage, fiduciary services and counselling, are
ignored here for ease of exposition. In actual cases the importance of these
changes should not be minimized. Their combined effect could be significant.
D. Net Discount Rate
A three percent real rate of return on investment less a two percent
growth rate for real wages produces a net discount rate of one percent to be
applied to Pierre's lost earnings.
E. Additional Living Expenses and Health Care Costs
Pierre's permanent disability will not only reduce his expected earnings;
it will also force him to bear additional living expenses and health care costs.
Some of the costs incurred by Pierre are once-and-for-all expenditures
that will not have to be repeated in the future;36 others are continuing ex-
penditures. The latter will increase over time as inflation and rising wages
affect the prices of medical supplies, equipment and labour services. In order
to adequately compensate Pierre for these escalating costs one must include
some adjustment for inflation and wage growth in the health care and living
expense projections. Like foregone earnings, the adjusted costs must be dis-
counted at a realistic rate of return to determine the lump sum equivalent in
current dollars.
The initial outlays classified as "once-and-for-all" totalled $5,500. The
yearly or "continuing" expenditures totalled $13,500. The continuing ex-
penditures can be further classified, however, according to their wage versus
price sensitivity.
Some expenditures such as those for medical supplies, equipment,
household items, and transportation are closely tied to the general price in-
creases (i.e., movements in the consumer price index). Other expenditures,
such as support services and the cost of a travelling companion represent
labour services, the costs of which increase with wages and salaries. Since
35 The slight negative correlation between the real returns generated by the two in-
vestment categories stabilize total returns and reduce overall risk.
36 This includes such things as modifications to Pierre's house to accommodate mov-
ing about in a wheelchair.
1978]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
wages and salaries are expected to increase by more than the rate of inflation,
these expenditures will grow at a faster rate than the "goods" expenditures.
The two percent differential is accounted for by the productivity com-
ponent in labour services. "Goods" prices can be proxied by increases in the
consumer price index. The net discount rate in this case is simply the real
rate of return on investment.
F. Tax Complications
These important adjustments will be passed here in order to simplify the
analysis. Their impact should not be underestimated, however.
G. Mortality Assumptions
It seems appropriate, and in line with current practice, to evaluate
Pierre's lost earnings as an electrician on the basis of his pre-accident mor-
tality. The 1975-77 Canadian Life Table (Males) has been used for this
computation. The 1978 Supreme Court decisions confirm that the lost earn-
ings should be based on the plaintiff's pre-accident mortality.37
In the present case, however, the plaintiff is expected to have some
residual earnings. It would seem much more realistic to use the plaintiff's
estimated post-accident mortality in computing the lump sum equivalent of
these residual earnings. The lump sum equivalent of these residual earnings
will be deducted from the lump sum equivalent of the pre-accident earnings
since it is this difference which represents the value of lost earnings.
Similarly, the value of future health care and additional living expenses
should be computed using the best possible estimate of the plaintiff's future
mortality. In the Andrews case both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court pointed out that it would have been more useful and accurate to use
statistics relating to the expectation of life of quadraplegics.38
A recent article in the Archives of Neurological Science dealing with the
survival rates of spinal cord injury patients is of considerable interest.3 9 Para-
plegic patients experience higher mortality rates than the population in gen-
eral. This paper shows that the highest mortality occurs in the first year after
the accident and, in particular, the first few months after the accident. The
likelihood of survival is influenced by both the age at the time of injury and
the level of the lesion. In many personal injury cases the trial often takes
place over a year after the accident by which time the plaintiff has survived
the most critical period even though his future life expectancy will normally
have been reduced. In the case of Pierre, it has been assumed that his post-
37 English courts have at last come around to this viewpoint as well: e.g., Pickett v.
British Rail Engineering Ltd., [1980] A.C. 136, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 955, [1979] 1 All E.R.
774 (H.L.).
38 Andrews, supra note 1, at 249 (S.C.R.), 467 (D.L.R.), 241 (C.C.L.T.); [1976]
2 W.W.R. 385 at 419-20, 64 D.L.R. (3d) 663 at 695-96 per McGillivray CJ.A.
(Alta C.A.).
39 Mesard et al., Survival After Spinal Cord Trauma (1978), 35 Arch. Neurological
Sci. 78.
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accident mortality will correspond to that of a male aged thirty years. Refer-
ring back to Table 2, as a result of the accident his life expectancy has been
shortened from 51.59 years to 42.40 years, a reduction of 9.19 years.
H. Other Contingencies
Under this heading are grouped all those events which might have affected
Pierre's future earnings or which might affect the cost of future care or the
extent to which he will be able to earn income in his post-accident state.
Clearly, there are a large number of factors that will have a bearing on this.
Currently the courts tend to make an arbitrary deduction of twenty percent
to allow for future contingencies. Three points can be made in this connec-
tion. First, not all the contingencies are adverse. Second, the estimation of the
amount of the deduction seems to be much more of an art than a science.
Third, there do not appear to be any compelling reasons for applying the
contingency factor to the cost of future care if an accurate estimate of the
plaintiff's future mortality has been made.
Essentially, the contingency adjustment is applied to cover the impact
of deviations from the assumptions and to allow for other factors that have
not been explicitly included. In both cases a more scientific approach is
available although it does not appear to be used often. In the case of Pierre,
suppose it is felt that there is a possibility that the retirement age may be
sixty and not sixty-five. If an estimate of this probability can be made, then
it would seem appropriate to incorporate such an estimate in the actual
calculations. For example, suppose that there is an equal probability of 0.5
that retirement will take place at age sixty or at age sixty-five. Under the
mortality and interest assumptions set out in Sections B, C, and H the capi-
talized value of $1,000 per annum payable from age twenty to age sixty is
$31,228. [See Table 6.] Hence the capitalized value of $30,000 per annum is
30 X 31228 = $936,810.
With a retirement age of 65 the value of $30,000 per annum is
30 X 33,745 = $1,012,350.
Hence: $
Capitalized value of $30,000 per annum 1,012,350
assuming retirement age sixty-five.
Capitalized value of $30,000 per annum 936,840
assuming retirement age of sixty.
Expected capitalized value when
there is a .5 probability of 974,595
either retirement age.
This last figure of 974,595 is obtained by computing
.5(936,840) + .5(1,012,350).
Another example of a contingency is future unemployment. It is sug-
gested that a study of historical trends should prove rewarding in the quest
for suitable estimates for the impact of this parameter. In Pierre's case, there
seems every likelihood that the demand for skilled electricians will continue
for at least the next decade. Even if the plaintiff were to become unemployed
in the future, however, the existence of unemployment insurance benefits
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serves to cushion the adverse financial impact of unemployment. In Pierre's
case the unemployment benefits do not, of course, replace his full earnings.
Moreover, this leads to a more general point relating to the appraisal
of the effect of contingencies. Many of the insurance and benefit programmes
operated by firms, trade unions and governments have as their principal aim
the protection of their members against the adverse financial consequences of
death, disability, unemployment and other perils. If the value of these bene-
fits is not included in the estimates of pecuniary loss then this should be
taken into consideration in arriving at the appropriate contingency deduc-
tion. It seems that the size of the reduction should be reduced considerably
in these circumstances. Of course it has to be recognized that many of these
benefit programmes are partly paid for by employees and this also has to be
taken into account.
The rationale for applying a contingency reduction to the award for the
cost of future care seems less clear. If there is a reduction made in this case
it must be on the grounds that the expected cost of this item has been over-
estimated. The argument that this reduction is to take account of the possibil-
ity of the plaintiff's early death will not hold if an accurate estimate of the
plaintiff's expected mortality is embodied in the calculations.
The present case follows precedent and takes a contingency reduction
of twenty percent in the value of lost prospective earnings. In this case it
turns out that the use of a twenty percent reduction for contingencies pre-
cisely offsets the amount included in Pierre's base earnings to allow for
fringe benefits. In other words, the same results would be obtained on the
basis of an initial earnings loss of $24,000 per annum and no reduction for
contingencies being used. Note that the inclusion of fringe benefits brings his
initial earnings up to $30,000 but that the twenty percent reduction brings
them back to $24,000. It is not suggested that those factors will always
cancel out exactly but this case study incorporates a substantial degree of
realism. It strengthens the conviction that in cases where fringe benefits are
not included in the computation the Courts should examine the situation
carefully rather than blindly apply a twenty percent contingency reduction.
I. Summary of assumptions and results of computations
Age of Plaintiff - 20 years
Current earnings as electrician $3




Annual outlays (labour services)
Mortality assumptions
Pre-accident mortality - male age 20 1975-77 Table
Post-accident mortality - male age 30 1975-77 Table
Assumed retirement age
Allowance for future unemployment
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I. Summary of assumptions and results of computations (continued)
Allowance for fringe benefits lost Full
Net discount rates used
Earnings 1% p.a.
Labour services 1% p.a.
Goods Expenditures 3% p.a.
Allowance for Taxation None
Estimates of Pecuniary Loss
1. Cost of future care
(a) Initial Outlays $ 5,500
(b) Capitalized value of annual outlays
on goods (annual amount $4,500) 103,509
(c) Capitalized value of annual outlays on
Labour services (annual amount $9,000) 304,533
2. Loss of future earnings
(a) Capitalized value of pre-accident
earnings less 20% contingency factor $809,880
(b) Less value of residual earnings
(less 20% contingency factor) (251,874)
Total $971,548
J. Computation of pecuniary losses using seven percent per annum
net discount rate
This computation shows the tremendous reduction in the size of the
award if the net discount rate used to value all future amounts is seven percent
per annum.
Revised Estimate of Pecuniary Losses
1. Cost of future care
(a) Initial Outlays $ 5,500
(b) Capitalized value of annual amount
of $4,500 at 7 percent per annum 58,478
(c) Capitalized value of annual
amount of $9,000 at 7 percent per annum 116,955
2. Loss of future earnings
(a) Capitalized value of pre-accident
earnings (30,000 p.a.) less 20% reduction $316,536
(b) Capitalized value of residual
earnings (10,000 p.a.) (102,958)
Total $394,511
Again, this example highlights the profound impact of the net discount
rate assumed for the calculations. In Pierre's case the award has been slashed
from $971,548 to $394,511, a reduction of $577,037. Note that in this case
the impact of the taxation factor has not been taken into account. If the
analysis presented in this paper is accepted as being substantially correct then
it would appear that the Supreme Court should rethink its position.
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VII. PERIODIC PAYMENTS
There are a number of problems with the system of making lump sum
awards for loss of earnings and continuing care. In recent years a number of
observers40 have suggested that a system of periodic payments would elimi-
nate some of these difficulties. It should be clear from the preceding parts
that there are considerable problems of estimation involved in the deter-
mination of the amount of the award. Furthermore, even with the best pos-
sible estimates it is highly unlikely that the amount of the award will coincide
exactly with the plaintiff's actual needs.
Mr. Justice Dickson has mentioned some of these problems:
The lump-sum award presents problems of great importance. It is subject to fluc-
tuation on investment; income from it is subject to tax. After judgment, new needs
arise and present needs are extinguished; yet our law of damages knows nothing of
periodic payments. The difficulties are greatest where there is a continuing need
for intensive and expensive care and a long-term loss of earning capacity.41
Professor O'Connell is very critical of various aspects of the lump-sum
system:
This is in contrast, of course, to other forms of insurance, such as medical and
disability insurance, in which payment is made periodically. This requirement of
one lump-sum payment means that when payment is made-if it is made--it
covers not only all the losses which have already accrued but also a final estimate
of all the losses ever to occur in the future. Once the damages are fixed by a
settlement or verdict, the amount ordinarily cannot be reviewed even if it turns out
to be woefully inadequate or wildly excessive. This means oftentimes that the set-
tlement process and the trial see the plaintiff's doctor grossly exaggerating the after-
effects of an injury while the insurance doctor is equally grossly disparaging them
-with the hapless and ignorant jury left eventually to decide between the warring
experts.4 2
Recently there has been increasing interest in structured settlements,4
which involve periodic payments in lieu of or in conjunction with lump sum
awards. Such a system would seem to offer considerable advantages. If the
payments are designed to continue throughout the plaintiff's future lifetime,
the risk of the plaintiff "outliving" the award can be eliminated. One of the
other major risks facing an injured plaintiff is the risk of unanticipated future
inflation. Again, structured settlements could be set up so as to protect the
plaintiff against this risk. To do this properly, the size of the payment should
be reviewed periodically and increased in line with some appropriate index
(such as the consumer price index or an earnings based index). In our view,
it is imperative that this provision be included if such settlements are to
accomplish their objectives.
4 0 E.g., Guile, Actuarial Evidence in the Quantum of Damages in Tort Law (1975),
10 U.B.C. L. Rev. 251.
41 Supra note 1, at 236 (S.C.R.), 458 (D.LR.), 230 (C.C.L.T.).
42 O'Connell, Ending Insult to Injury (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1975) at 49.
43 Cave, Structured Settlements, An Alternative Resolution of Claims Involving
Death or Substantial Injury (1979), 30 Advocate 331; Monopoli, "Sued or Suing: Both
May Win with Annuity," Financial Post July 19, 1980 at 1-2; Kakosclike, "Damage
Awards to use Structured Settlements?", National July-August, 1980.
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APPENDIX I
INFLATION, WAGE GROWTH AND LONG-TERM BOND YIELDS
1962- 1980








































Average 5.4 8.3 8.6
Note that all tables do not simply reprint figures from the tables cited. Rather these
figures have been arrived at via an intermediate calculation.
(a) Inflation is measured by the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)-
derived from Table 1.
(b) Hourly wages in the manufacturing sector-derived from Table 1.
(c) The McLeod, Young and Wier index of long-term industrial bonds-derived from
Table 20.
Source: Bank of Canada, Bank of Canada Review, Tables 1 and 20, various issues
(monthly) (Ottawa).
APPENDIX II
AVERAGE INFLATION RATES IN CANADA: 1915 - 1978
Interval Inflation Interval Inflation
1915-1925 4.0% 1925-1950 1.3%
1925-1935 -2.3% 1950-1975 3.5%
1935-1945 2.2%
1945 - 1955 4.5% 1925 - 1975 2.4%
1955-1965 1.9% 1915-1978 2.9%
1965-1975 5.6%
1975-1978 8.4%
Sources: Bank of Canada, Bank of Canada Review, various issues (monthly) (Ottawa).
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APPENDIX III
INFLATION AND PRODUCTIVITY FORECASTS: 1978 - 1985
(all figures in percentages)
Inflation Productivity
Department of Finance 8.4 - 9.5 .6
Economic Council of Canada 8.8 1.2
Informetrica 7.3 - 8.3 1.5
Data Resources Inc. 7.9 1.1
Source: Department of Finance. The Economic Assumptions Underlying the Fiscal Pro-
jections of the Budget, December 11, 1979, at 16, 20. Table 7, p. 16; Projected Percentage
Rates of Growth of CPI 1979 to 1985 acts as the basis for Department of Finance's
estimates which appear in Table 8, at 20: Main Elements of the Most Recent DRI (Data
Resources Incorporated) Informetrica and Economic Council of Canada Projections
compared to the Department of Finance Projections 1979 to 1985.
APPENDIX IV
ACTUAL AND FORECAST INFLATION: 1967 - 1981
(all figures in percentages)





1971 2.8 forecast average forecast average
1972 4.8 inflation inflation
of 2.5-3.0% of 4.5%1973 7.6 per year per year
1974 10.9 9.9
1975 10.8 7.7
1976 7.5 6.5 (versus an actual
1977 8.0 6.5 8.0 inflation rate
1978 8.9 6.3 6.0 of 6.1% over
1979 9.8 5.0 this period)
1980 11.1" 4.3




*Based on 10 months of 1980 and converted to an annual rate.
(a) Medium-term Forecast, Economic Council of Canada, "Economic Targets and
Social Indicators," Annual Review 1971, Table 7-3 Provisional Forecast of Changes in
Consumer Price Indexes, Canada's Principal Trading Patterns, 1974-78, weighted aver-
age, at 168.
(b) Medium-term Forecast, Department of Finance, Canada's Economy-Medium Term
Projections and Targets, February 1978, Table 18. Price, Wage and Unit Labour Cost
Scenario 1977-81. Price Percentage Change from Previous Year, at 61.
(c) Long-term Forecast, Economic Council of Canada, The Years to 1980: The Ninth
Annual Review (Ottawa: ECC, 1972) at 36, Table 4-2, Average Annual Percentage
Change in Labour Force and Employment and Average Unemployment Rates.
(d) Financial Post Publications: Habibugahi and Weintraub, "How Much Inflation in
the 1970s?" Financial Post, January 3, 1970, at 5.
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APPENDIX V
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES FOR REAL HOURLY WAGES,
BY INDUSTRY
Interval Construction Manufacturing Services
1965-1978 5.5% 3.1% 2.1%
1945 - 1978 5.8% 2.8% 2.4%
1920-1978 3.1% 2.8% n.a.
Source: Bank of Canada, Bank of Canada Review, monthly (Ottawa). Statistics Canada,
Employment Earnings and Hours, monthly, (Ottawa). Urquhart and Buckley, Historical
Statistics of Canada, (Toronto: MacMillan, 1965).
APPENDIX VI
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES FOR REAL INCOMES
IN SELECTED PROFESSIONS: CANADA
Interval Doctors Lawyers Accountants Engineers
1965 - 1975 1.6% 2.8% 4.1% 2.9%
1955 - 1965 4.7% 2.7% 2.5% 1.4%
1950- 1975 3.0% 2.8% n.a. 2.3%
Source: Bank of Canada, Bank of Canada Review, monthly (Ottawa). Revenue Canada.
"Taxable Income by Occupation," Taxation Statistics, annual (Ottawa).
APPENDIX VII*




Common stocks 9.2% 22.4%
L-T Corporate bonds 4.1 5.6
L-T Government bonds 3.4 5.8
Treasury bills 2.4 2.1
Inflation 2.3 4.8




Common stocks 6.7% 22.6%
L-T Corporate bonds 1.6 11.2
L-T Government bonds 1.0 8.0
Treasury bills 0.0 4.6
* Risk is represented by the standard deviation statistic reported opposite each of the
average returns. The higher the standard deviation the more variable (or risky) is the
investment return.
Sources: Williamson, Rates of Return on Stocks and Bonds: Historical Comparisons (un-
published manuscript, U.B.C. Fac. of Comm. and Bus. Admin., 1977). (Canadian figures)
Ibbotson and Sinquefield, Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation: The Past (1926-1976) and the
Future (1977-2000) (Chicago: Financial Analysts, Research Foundation, 1976). (Ameri-
can figures)
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APPENDIX VIII
CANADA
AVERAGE NOMINAL RATES OF RETURN:
1937 to 1976
Average rate Standard Deviation
Inflation 3.7% 3.7%
Stocks 8.1 16.8
Government bonds 3.1 5.9
Treasury bills 2.8 2.5
AVERAGE REAL RATES OF RETURN:
1937 to 1976
Average rate Standard Deviation
Stocks 4.3% 17.2%
Government bonds -. 6 7.2
Treasury bills -. 8 3.7
UNITED STATES
AVERAGE NOMINAL RATES OF RETURN:
1937 to 1976
Average rate Standard Deviation
Inflation 3.6% 4.0%
Stocks 9.5 19.1
Government bonds 2.9 5.6
Treasury bills 2.5 2.2
AVERAGE REAL RATES OF RETURN:
1937 to 1976
Average rate Standard Deviation
Stocks 5.7% 20.06%
Government bonds -. 7 7.0
Treasury bills -1. 1 3.6
Sources: Williamson, Rates of Return on Stocks and Bonds: Historical Comparisons (un-
published manuscript, U.B.C. Fac. of Comm. and Bus. Admin., 1977). (Canadian figures)
Ibbotson and Sinquefield, Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation: The Past (1926-1976) and
the Future (1977-2000) (Chicago: Financial Analysts' Research Foundation, 1976).
(American figures)
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APPENDIX IX
AVERAGE NOMINAL RATES OF RETURN IN %
For the decade CANADA
ending 12/31 Stocks Govt. Bonds Corp. Bonds
1976 6.28 4.87 6.10
1975 4.41 3.16 3.80
1974 3.32 3.00 2.91
1973 8.93 3.81 4.03
1972 10.51 4.10 4.34
1971 7.06 4.27 3.90
1970 9.27 4.09 3.39
1969 9.86 2.64 3.22
1968 10.44 2.42 2.88
1967 11.24 1.86 2.95
1966 6.91 2.79 3.77
1965 9.19 2.23 3.10
1964 11.07 2.08 3.40
1963 11.99 2.39 3.97
1962 10.37 2.32 3.83
Average 8.72 3.07 3.71
UNITED STATES


















AVERAGE REAL RATES OF RETURN IN %
CANADA
Stocks Govt. Bonds Corp. Bonds Stocks
.20 -1.13 .03 .72
-1.36 -2.55 -1.94 -2.31
-1.76 -2.09 -2.18 -3.77
4.56 -. 35 -. 14 1.81
6.83 .63 .86 6.30
3.86 1.15 .78 3.75
6.49 1.44 .76 5.11
7.09 .04 .61 5.16
7.99 .15 .60 7.78
8.94 -. 25 .82 10.88
4.87 .83 1.80 7.29
7.19 .35 1.21 9.18
9.29 .45 1.75 11.08
10.35 .89 2.45 14.31
8.93 .98 2.48 11.99
5.56 .04 .66 5.95
UNITED STATES
Govt. Bonds Corp. Bonds
-1.52
-2.54
-2.86
-1.93
-1.03
-. 70
-1.58
-1.05
-. 32
-. 63
1.06
.16
.12
.63
.98
-. 75
-. 46
-2.01
-2.92
-1.14
-. 36
-. 09
-. 40
-. 82
.37
.18
1.50
.84
1.09
1.32
1.54
-. 09
For the decade
ending 12/31
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
Average
19781
